Far from expert, I am experienced on and beside racing tracks. I agree and disagree with Keir:
Sorry to have ruffled a few feathers, but the reason Giunti died was "RACING".
Very plain and even more simple.
I think Keir is correct in asserting "RACING" as reason for the accident, but deny any possibility that it is either plain or simple.
Racing changes everything. It brings to the fore such competitive spirit as exists in drivers, sharpens and empowers it to an extent it is barely under control.
What I have found by being
on race tracks is that even a mild, thoughtful, fearful person such as I can be drawn into instances and circumstances well removed from rational behavior. From many, many hours beside race tracks I learned that the true competitors are most likely to sacrifice legitimacy and safety in order to prevail, if their talent doesn't allow them to prevail at the moment.
My single most vociferous and heartfelt complaint against true competitors was and is that they fail to reduce speed sufficiently in standing- and waving-yellow situations. Their consistent attitude, expressed to me in numerous face-to-face confrontations, was, "I know how fast I can go to be safe in those circumstances. Anything comes up, I can handle it." In the case of subsequent accident due to excessive speed at yellow-flag scenes, they added some phrase constituting deflection of blame onto "accident" or the action of some other person.
In a properly configured racing scenario, every participant is alert and cognizant. They do not lose sight of the rules, nor of the roles of others.
I assign blame in this Giunti episode as follows:
Giunti - 10%
Parkes - 10%
Beltoise - 10%
Marshals - 10%
Chief/Operating Steward - 10%
As far as I can see from the "evidence" here, each of those named above was acting within the specifications of his job, as he had learned it, up to the point of the collision.
Giunti, Parkes, Beltoise had all learned to extract as much as possible from any circumstance: drive fast, don't slow when others do, or not as much; if you suffer a setback, try to recover as best you can; depend on those around you to give consideration and space in a squeeze; give that consideration only when inevitable disaster is the alternative.
Marshals had learned what to expect from drivers and race operators, and what to expect from each other and themselves: they are inconsiderable, ignored until after the accident, and vulnerable physically like no others at the track.
Chief/Operating Steward, responsible to all the varied (sometimes competing among themselves) interests, had learned all the lessons of competitors, marshals, and many others. His knowledge led to confidence that if each interest performed its task properly, things would eventually emerge as they should: sponsors money shows up and is well spent; racers show up and put on a good, safe event; organizers supply competent workers who pay attention and act appropriately in controlling spectators and participants; all in concert, and all in conformance with the written and unwritten rules.
Unwritten rules. Those are the ones responsible for the remaining fifty per cent. of blame. History.
Drivers know when they cut a corner or two and get away with it, they are regarded not always with disdain, but as "real competitors". They know none of their fellow drivers will complain (well, almost never), and will in all likelihood take the same course given the opportunity and need.
Marshals know drivers regard them as irritants, that any of their discriminative actions can be second-guessed, and that even though they have made formal and informal complaints, "the organization" responds with insufficient conviction that the marshals' position is valid. After the accident, requirements on marshals are a little more clearcut.
Chief/Operating Stewards have learned to balance competing interests. Or the frustrations of attempting to balance them. They know racers will complain if they are called to account durning a race on the basis of a marshal's complaint. They know marshals complain very little since their history tells them it is useless or worse, prejudicial to their organization and its future. Stewards know it is desirable to execute a smooth, efficient, program of events, that anything interfering with that or casting doubt upon its results is to be avoided when possible.
So there you have it: my plain and simple analysis of (some of) the other-than-physical-forces at work in the G-B affair.
Clearly, the major culprit was history, as each of the principals knew it. Given history, and circumstances, the accident was inevitable. Fifty per cent. of the problem was being there; the other fifty per cent. was impossible to change, and it was there, too.
Frank S
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